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I. THE PROBLEMS
A. Choice of Law
In Milkovich v. Saarit the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the
choice influencing considerations of Professor Leflar for solving in-
terstate conflicts in tort law. 2 The results, reflected in the Minne-
sota cases decided since then,3 are: (1) that the law of the forum or
"justice-administering state" has been selected as the "better rule
of law ' 4 in all cases but two, 5 and (2) that the plaintiff-favoring
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law
1. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
2. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAw §§ 103-107 (3d ed. 1977); set Milkovich
v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 161-71, 203 N.W.2d 408, 414-17 (1973).
3. See infra notes 59-148 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Myers v. Government Employee Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 366-68, 225
N.W.2d 238, 243-44 (1974); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170-71, 203 N.W.2d 408,
417 (1973).
5. See generally infra notes 59-148 and accompanying text. The two exceptions are
Myers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974),see infra
notes 83-87 and accompanying text, and Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn.
1981), see bifra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
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law has been chosen in all cases but one6 in accordance with the
court's notions of fairly and justly distributing tort losses among
the insurance premium-paying public. 7 These results have been
both commended 8 and criticized. 9
The plaintiff-favoring policy represents the modern develop-
ment in substantive tort law.'0 The "better rule of law" test, if
applied objectively to "true" conflicts, leads to a just result.I'
On the other hand, applying the "better rule of law" in accord-
ance with a court's concepts of what is fair and just in establishing
domestic substantive law leads to the choice of forum law in nearly
all interstate conflicts cases; the necessity for any separate body of
conflict of laws principles disappears and "conflicts justice" in con-
nection with interstate transactions and events, involving multiple
parties from different states with conflicting laws, does not neces-
sarily flow from domestic justice.' 2 The controversy, therefore, is
between a method and a principled resolution of interstate
conflicts. 3
6. See generally infra notes 59-148 and accompanying text. The one exception is Davis
v. Furlong, 328 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1983). See inqfa notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1979), afd, 449
U.S. 302 (198 1); Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 284 N.W.2d 829, 833-34 (Minn.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
8. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.32 (2d ed.
1980); Todd, A judge's View, 31 S.C.L. REV. 435 (1980).
9. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Process: Addendum 1972, 17 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 651, 653 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cavers, Choice-of-Law Process]; Cavers, The Value of
Prncipled Preferences, 49 TEX. L. REV. 211, 214-15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cavers, Prin-
cipled Preferences]; Reese, American Trends in Private International Law. Academic andJudicial
Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND. L. REV. 717, 725-26 (1980); 58
MINN. L. REV. 199 (1973).
10. "[L]oss-distribution through the tort-feasor's liability insurance represents the
most pervasive aspect of tort development in this country over the past several decades."
R. WEINTRAUB, sUpra note 8, § 6.32. "[O]ne of the functions of conflict-of-laws decisions is
to serve as growing pains for the law of a state . ..." Freund, ChiefJustice Stone and the
Confict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1216 (1946).
11. "The use of such a 'better law' criterion is commendable and is to be encouraged
provided that two conditions on its use are met. First . . .that the conflict . . . not be a
spurious conflict .. .[and second], [that] the better law should be selected by objective
standards .... " R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, § 6.27.
12. "I see the 'better law' criterion applied in domestic cases as affording a false anal-
ogy, an escape that is not responsive to a choice-of-law problem confronting the court."
Cavers, Prncpled References, supra note 10, at 215.
"To use this standard [the law which best accords with present-day ideas of justice
and convenience] seems to me to retreat from choice of law as a branch of Private Interna-
tional Law." Cavers, Choice-of-Law Process, supra note 10, at 653.
13. Reese, supra note 10; Sedler, On Choice of Law and the Great Quest. A Critique of
Special Multistate Solutions to Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 807 (1979); Traut-
man, A Comment on Twerski and Mayer. A Pragmatic Step Towards Consensus as a Bass for
[Vol. 8
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B. Judiczal Ju, sdion, Legislative Jurisdiction, and Choice of Law
The Minnesota cases' 4 decided since Mi'lkovch v. Saari also re-
flect the close but troublesome relationship among judicial juris-
diction, legislative jurisdiction, and choice of law.' 5 If a defendant
has sufficient contacts with the forum state to permit the exercise
of jurisdiction over the person or property interests of the defend-
ant without violation of federal constitutional due process (judicial
jurisdiction),' 6 the forum may choose its own law if it wishes to do
so under its choice of law method. This choice must not infringe
the federal constitutional requirements of due process17 and full
faith and credit 18 (legislative jurisdiction) ' 9 for lack of an adequate
connection between the forum and the involved transaction or
parties.
The connectional requirements of judicial and legislative juris-
diction may sometimes overlap, 20 but compliance with the stan-
dards of one does not necessarily satisfy the other. The interests of
a forum state which constitutionally permit application of forum
law may not by themselves provide sufficient contact to allow judi-
cial jurisdiction over the person or property interests of the defend-
ant.2 ' Judicial jurisdiction does not automatically subsume the
Choice-of-Law Solutions, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833 (1979); Twerski & Mayer, Multistate Choice-
of-Law Rules: Continuing the Colloquy with Professors Trautman and Sedler, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
843 (1979).
14. See infra notes 59-148 and accompanying text.
15. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, §§ 29-55; Fischer, Shaffer v. Heitner: Some Thoughts on
Its Impact on the Doctnes of Choice of Law and Preclusion by Judgment, 30 CASE W.L. REV. 74
(1979); Grossman, Statutes ofLimitations and the Confttt of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 44-64; Hay, The Interrelation ofJurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United States Con-
fects Law, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 161 (1979); Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Martin, PersonalJursdiction and
Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Martin, PersonalJundic-
tion ]; Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Martin, 4 Reply to Professor Kirgis]; Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Martin, Constitutional Limitations].
16. See infla notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Id. art. IV, § 1;see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
19. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text; see also Reese, Legis/atwieJurisdiction,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).
20. See Hay, supra note 15, at 165, 170-83.
21. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). In this series of decisions the
Supreme Court did not equate legislative jurisdiction with judicial jurisdiction. But see
McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir.) (court equates
legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454 U.S, 1071 (1981).
19821
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constitutional right to apply forum law.22
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 23 restrict-
ing the extra-territorial extension of the states' judicial jurisdiction
have led commentators to suggest that the standards for judicial
and legislative jurisdiction should be merged.2 4 The Court, how-
ever, has not yet definitely fixed either the bases or limits of legisla-
tive jurisdiction. As a result a debate has ensued over the proper
standard for fixing such bounds: whether legislative jurisdiction
should be based on or limited by due process or full faith and
credit, or whether a single standard based on both due process and
full faith and credit should be developed. 25 The Court's recent
restrictions on judicial jurisdiction not only limit the opportunities
of the states to exercise any choice of law, 26 but they present seri-
ous questions as to the present boundaries of judicial jurisdiction.
2 7
II. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
Rush v. Savchuk 28 is an example of a case in which the Supreme
Court, by restricting the forum's judicial jurisdiction, frustrated
the application of forum law by a Minnesota court. Two Indiana
residents were involved in an automobile accident in Indiana.
One of them moved to Minnesota and there instituted a quasi in
rem action against the other by garnishing the contingent liability
of the Indiana defendant's liability insurer doing business in Min-
22. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). For an argument that
judicial jurisdiction should derive from legislative jurisdiction, see Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner, The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978); see also Hay, supra note 15.
23. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
24. See Grossman, supra note 15, at 53-56; Hay, supra note 15, at 170-83; Martin,
Persona/Jurisdiction, supra note 15, at 873-79.
25. Compare Kirgis, supra note 15, with Martin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 15,
and Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, supra note 15.
26. See Hay, supra note 15, at 165-66.
27. See Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Per-
sonamjur rdtction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979); Hay, supra note 15, at 166-70; Hill, Of
"Ands" and "Ors" Miizmal Contacts After Shaffer v. Heitner, 3 GLENDALE L. REV. 119
(1978-1979); Louis, The Grasp of Long ArmJursdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407
(1980); Ratner, Procedural Due Process andjurisdicton to Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litikation Val-
ues vs. The Territorial Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U.L.
REV. 363, 364-81 (1981); Comment, The Assertion ofJurisdicton Based upon Attachment After
Shaffer v. Heitner: A Model Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 377 (1980).
28. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
(Vol. 8
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nesota. Under Minnesota's choice of law rules, the Minnesota
court would have applied the Minnesota laws of ordinary 29 and
comparative negligence30 and Minnesota's statute of limitations3'
as the better rules of law favoring the Minnesota plaintiff in prefer-
ence to the Indiana guest statute32 requiring proof of gross negli-
gence, Indiana's law of contributory negligence, 3 3 and the Indiana
statute of limitations.
34
The Supreme Court, however, following its decision in Shafr v.
HtezIner,3 5 held that no due process basis existed for quasi in rem
jurisdiction in the absence of any connection between the property
garnished, the forum, and the litigation.3 6 In Shaffr v. Heitner, also
a quasi in rem action, the Court further said that henceforth the
same due process standards for judicial jurisdiction shall be ap-
plied to in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem actions. 37 This has
raised questions about the continued validity of previously settled
due process bases for in personam jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations who are licensed or doing business in the forum state, and
perhaps even over domestic corporations, when suits are brought
on causes of action unrelated to forum corporate business. 38 Tran-
sient jurisdiction over a non-resident individual based on physical
power by service of process in the forum state is also questionable
39
unless the cause of action sued upon is related to the defendant's
activities in the forum. If not, any contacts of a non-resident de-
fendant with that state, such as business interests, a vacation
home, a farm, or a bank account, may not be adequate to provide
a valid due process basis for in personam or quasi in rem
29. See inra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
30. See tna notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
32. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 325 n.8 (1980).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 322 n.2.
35. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
36. Id. at 208-16.
37. 433 U.S. at 211 n.38.
38. Before Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), a foreign corporation regularly
doing a substantial volume of business in a state was amenable to process on causes of
action unrelated to that business. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952); see Deoelopments in the Law--State-Court Junsdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919-23
(1960). But see Glen, An Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jursdiction,
45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 607 (1979); Leflar, Conk'a of Laws, 1979 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 1;
Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-OrentedJu i-
tion, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 565 (1979).
39. See Bernstine, supra note 27, at 60-68; Werner, supra note 38, at 588-89.
1982]
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jurisdiction. 4°
III. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
Rush v. Savchuk 41 prevented the application of Minnesota law by
denying quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Court, therefore, did not
need to reach the question of whether Minnesota law could have
been chosen without violation of due process or full faith and
credit in view of the absence of any connections between the fo-
rum, the automobile accident, or the parties except that Minne-
sota was the residence of the plaintiff and the liability insurer
(garnishee) did business there.
42
A bill43 was introduced in the 1980 session of the Minnesota leg-
islature whereby an insured person may bring a direct action
against a tortfeasor's liability insurer, licensed or doing business in
Minnesota, upon causes of action wherever they may arise. The
mere regulatory interest of Minnesota over insurance companies
licensed or doing business in the state, even if coupled with the
local residence of the plaintiff, may not be sufficient to provide
either judicial jurisdiction over the insurer under Shaffer v. Htner
or legislative jurisdiction under the full faith and credit and due
process clauses44 when, as in Savchuk, the insured tortfeasor is a
non-resident without contacts to the State of Minnesota, and suit
is brought against the insurer in Minnesota on a cause of action
unrelated to the forum, based on an insurance policy issued in an-
other state without a direct action statute.
A. Full Faith and Credit
The connectional requirements that permit a state's laws to be
applied without violation of the full faith and credit clause are best
exemplified by a series of workers' compensation cases decided by
the Supreme Court.4 5 A forum state may constitutionally choose
its workers' compensation act in preference to that of another state
40. See Comment, supra note 27; Note, Due Process and Long ArmJurtsdcttzon in Minnesota.
A Criticism of the Minimum Contacts Standard, 5 Wm. MITcHELL L. REV. 287, 307-08 (1979).
41. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
42. Id. at 325 & n.8.
43. H.F. 2212, 71st Minn. Legis., 1980 2d Sess.; S.F. 2262, 71st Minn. Legis., 1980 2d
Sess.
44. See inrfa notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Alaska Pack-
ers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
[Vol. 8
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if (1) the work-related injury occurred in the forum; 4 6 (2) the con-
tract of employment was entered into in that state;47 or (3) the
worker resides and is employed in the forum and the employer is
located there.48 The Court has not yet held that either the local
residence of an employee or the employer's being licensed and do-
ing business in a state, or both, is sufficient, without more, to sat-
isfy the requirements of the full faith and credit clause.
In the recent case of Nevada v. Hall,49 a non-workers' compensa-
tion case, the Court allowed California to impose full liability on
the State of Nevada for an automobile accident in California in
which the California plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a
State of Nevada employee, despite Nevada's having not consented
to suit in California. Because the State of Nevada had waived its
sovereign immunity and consented to be sued only in the courts of
Nevada, the state argued that the full faith and credit clause re-
quired California to respect Nevada's sovereign immunity from
nonconsensual suit in California. In the alternative the state ar-
gued that, at the very least, the full faith and credit clause re-
quired California to honor the limited maximum recovery allowed
against Nevada in actions in Nevada courts. The Supreme Court
found no full faith and credit basis for Nevada's arguments. 50
B. Due Process
The question of when a state may choose its law without depriv-
ing an interested party of liberty or property in violation of the
due process clause has arisen primarily in the insurance cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court.5I The occurrence in a state of the
events giving rise to an insured loss or covered liability is a suffi-
cient connection to allow the application of the state's statute of
limitations52 or its direct action statute 53 against the insurer de-
spite contrary provisions in the insurance policy or conflicting laws
in the state where the policy was issued.
46. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501-05
(1939).
47. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 539-41
(1935).
48. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 279 (1980).
49. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
50. Id. at 424.
51. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
52. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
53. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
19821
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In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 54 however, the Court would not
permit the forum, Texas, to apply its longer statute of limitations
in favor of the insured plaintiff, a permanent Texas resident,
whose boat exploded in Mexican waters. The insurance policy
was issued in Mexico by the defendant, a Mexican insurance com-
pany, to cover the boat in Mexican waters while the plain-
tiff/insured was temporarily residing and operating the boat in
Mexico. Here, judicial jurisdiction was obtained in a quasi in rem
action which would probably not now be valid under Shafer v.
Heitner or Savchuk .
5 5
The exact limits of due process for legislative jurisdiction have
not as yet been established, and the respective roles of due process
and full faith and credit in determining when legislative jurisdic-
tion exists are unclear. 56 A recent decision of the Supreme Court
has cast very little illumination upon this cloudy area.
57
IV. THE MINNESOTA CASES
Milkovich v. Saart58 was the last in a series of guest statute cases
59
in which the Minnesota Supreme Court chose Minnesota's law of
ordinary negligence over conflicting guest statutes which require
proof of gross negligence. In the earlier cases, the court reached
that result by a somewhat different route, following a grouping of
contacts ("center of gravity") or policy-centered approach 60 in
54. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
55. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 15.
57. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); see infia notes 98-109 and accom-
panying text. "Hague has perpetuated, or possibly intensified the confusion and uncer-
tainty that have characterized constitutional choice-of-law theory." Brilmayer, Legitimate
Interest in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315,
1315-16 (1981); see also Cavers, Introduction to Symposium. Choice-of-Law Theory After Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1981); Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law
Reviewing Standard-Refections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REV. 327,
327-28, 355 (1982); Note, Constitutional Choice of Lawt-Forum State Must Have a Suftient Ag-
gregate of Contacts to Apply Forum Law.. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633
(1981), 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 983 (1981); SETON HALL L. REV. 770 (1981). But see
Weinberg, Choice-of-Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982).
58. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
59. See Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bolgrean v. Stich,
293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d
254 (1968); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
60. Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 5, 199 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1972); Bolgrean v.
Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 10, 196 N.W.2d 442, 443-44 (1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn.
139, 143-45, 158 N.W.2d 254, 259 (1968); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 443, 141
N.W.2d 526, 528 (1966).
[Vol. 8
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which the policy of compensating tort victims and spreading their
losses prevailed over the policy of preventing collusion between
guest and host and protecting the gratuitous host from the un-
grateful guest.
The court used this same approach in the earlier landmark case
of Schmidt v. Drscoll Hotel,6' when the place-of-injury ru!e for solv-
ing tort conflicts was first abandoned. The Schmidt court applied
Minnesota's Civil Damage Act 62 to a Wisconsin automobile acci-
dent in which a Minnesota plaintiff was injured by the negligence
of an intoxicated Minnesota motorist to whom the defendant, a
Minnesota liquor vendor, illegally sold liquor in Minnesota. The
Minnesota policy of compensation for innocent victims of illegal
liquor sales was given preference over Wisconsin's law of non-lia-
bility. No problems of judicial or legislative jurisdiction were
presented by this case.
Schmidt v. Drisrcoll Hotel was followed by Balts v. BaIts 63 in which
the court abrogated the rule of parent-child tort immunity and
permitted a Minnesota father to recover damages from his minor
son for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Wisconsin.
The Minnesota policy of compensation for tort victims prevailed
over the policy of protection of family harmony and preventing
collusion among family members.64 The court clearly did not ex-
ceed its judicial or legislative jurisdiction in this case.
In Mlov'ch v. Saari65 the court first expressly adopted Professor
Leflar's five choice influencing considerations:
1. Predictability of Result, 66 an important factor in resolving
conflicts in the areas of consensual arrangements, property
rights, and the status of persons;
2. Maintenance of International and Interstate Order,
67
whereby the state with a negligible factual connection in
relation to the policy underlying its law defers to the state
with a substantial relationship relevant to its policy, so that
particularly in the fields of property, corporations, and sta-
tus of persons, in which stability, uniformity, and certainty
are important, the interstate and international movement
61. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
62. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1982).
63. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
64. Id. at 425-26, 142 N.W.2d at 73.
65. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
66. R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, § 103.
67. Id. § 104.
19821
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of goods and people is not impeded nor retaliation by sister
states or foreign nations provoked;
3. Simplification of the Judicial Task,6a by which a court's
choice of law may depend on the ease of ascertaining and
applying the law of a sister state as compared to forum law,
such as procedure, with which the local court is familiar;
4. Advancement of the Forum's Governmental Interest,
69
leading to the choice of forum law when the policy under-
lying forum law plus the forum's factual relationship rele-
vant to that policy (governmental interest) is at least equal
to the governmental interest of the state or states with con-
flicting laws;
5. Better Rule of Law,70 the objectively selected preferable
law which is in accord with modern development as op-
posed to a conflicting obsolete archaic rule which is a "drag
on the coat-tails of civilization."
7
1
Milkovich v. Saari was a suit by an Ontario guest against an On-
tario host for damages for personal injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident in Minnesota. Ontario had a guest statute.
Minnesota did not. The court said that the first three of Professor
Leflar's considerations were of minor importance: predictability of
result was of little importance because people do not plan to com-
mit torts;72 maintenance of international order was not important
because Minnesota's interest was more than negligible and the
choice of Minnesota law would not significantly affect interna-
tional commerce or provoke retaliation by a foreign state; 73 and
simplification of the judicial task was of no consequence because
either of the competing rules could be easily ascertained and
applied.
7 4
The court then chose the "better rule of law" 75 of Minnesota as
the "justice-administering state, ' 76 the guest statute of Ontario be-
ing considered incompatible with the Minnesota court's concepts
of fairness and justice. Mikovich presented no problems of judicial
or legislative jurisdiction. The accident occurred in Minnesota,
supplying an adequate connection for those purposes. In all of the
68. Id. § 105.
69. Id. § 106.
70. Id. § 107.
71. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 355, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (1966).
72. 295 Minn. at 164-70, 203 N.W.2d at 414-17.
73. Id. at 170, 203 N.W.2d at 416-17.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 171, 203 N.W.2d at 416-17.
76. Id. at 170, 203 N.W.2d at 416-17.
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conflicts cases decided since Milkovich the "better rule of law" has
been the decisive rule of choice. 77 The court has had only three
occasions to use Professor Leflar's choice influencing considera-
tions in areas other than tort law.78
In the next case, Schwartz v. Consohdated Freightways Corp. ,79 the
court chose the Minnesota comparative fault statute8o as the "bet-
ter rule of law," favoring a Minnesota plaintiff injured in Indiana
over Indiana's law of contributory negligence. The result is that
the Minnesota law of comparative fault follows Minnesotans
wherever they go, provided Minnesota courts can get judicial juris-
diction over the adverse parties.
In Schwartz the court came close to exceeding its legislative juris-
diction, 8' and perhaps in light of Shafer v. Heitner even its judicial
jurisdiction, which depended on the fact that the corporate de-
fendants were doing business in Minnesota, although unrelated to
the cause of action upon which suit was brought. The Minnesota
plaintiff was injured in a three-truck accident in Indiana when his
Minnesota-based truck collided with two Ohio-based trucks on an
interstate trip having no connection to Minnesota. Both judicial
and legislative jurisdiction depended on the plaintiff's Minnesota
residence and the two Ohio corporations' unrelated Minnesota
business. In choosing Minnesota's "better law," the court appar-
ently gave no consideration to the law of Ohio, which was the
same as that of Indiana.82
Myers v. Government Employees Insurance Co. 83 is the first of two
cases in which the court did not apply forum law when faced with
a conflict of laws. A Minnesota plaintiff was injured in Louisiana
in an automobile accident with Louisiana residents. The plaintiff
sued the Louisiana liability insurer of the Louisiana resident under
Louisiana's direct action statute. The court applied Louisiana
law, saying that the policy underlying Minnesota's prohibition of
direct actions against insurance companies for their protection
against prejudiced juries was weak; that the Louisiana law, favor-
77. See infra notes 79-143 and accompanying text.
78. See infa notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
79. 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); see also
Meyer v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 508 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1975).
80. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982).
81. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, § 6.26.
82. Compare Booher v. Alhom, Inc., 156 Ind. App. 192, 295 N.E.2d 841 (1973) with
Wren v. Steiger, 23 Ohio App. 2d 135, 261 N.E.2d 191 (1970).
83. 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974).
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ing plaintiffs and relieving them of the necessity of filing multiple
suits for recovery of tort damages, was intended for the benefit of
the public, including Minnesotans; and that the Minnesota plain-
tiff had acquired a "vested substantive right" under Louisiana law
which Minnesota had an interest in protecting. 4 The conflict be-
tween the two laws on this issue is almost miniscule, when viewed
in this light.
Minnesota could clearly apply Louisiana law without any viola-
tion of due process or full faith and credit. Judicial jurisdiction,
however, was based on the insurance company's unrelated busi-
ness in Minnesota.
To further protect the "vested substantive right" of the Minne-
sota plaintiff, the Myers court chose the Minnesota six-year statute
of limitations over Louisiana's one-year statute, saying that Louisi-
ana was not interested in the application of its limitations to Min-
nesota courts.8 5 One member of the court would have chosen the
six-year statute as the better rule of law.
8 6
An argument can be made that the limitations period should be
that of the state whose substantive law governs the action. Under
the theory of d~pe age,8 7 however, the laws of several states may
be applied to multiple substantive issues as to which there is a con-
flict. In choosing the Minnesota limitations period, which Minne-
sota considers adequate to protect defendants and the Minnesota
judicial system from stale claims and suits, Minnesota, the forum,
clearly had a sufficient connection for legislative jurisdiction.
In 1983 the Minnesota court, in a five-four decision, distin-
guished the Myers case when it held that the choice influencing
considerations of Professor Leflar will not be used to resolve con-
flicts of procedural iaw. Instead the law of the forum will govern.
In Davis v. Furlong88 the plaintiff was a Minnesota resident who was
a passenger in a car owned and driven by Wisconsin residents.
The plaintiff was injured in Wisconsin when the car she was in
collided with a car driven and owned by a Minnesota resident.8 9
84. Id. at 363-64, 366, 368, 225 N.W.2d at 241-42, 244. The "vested rights" theory
has been discredited by the modern writers. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, § 86.
85. 302 Minn. at 366, 225 N.W.2d at 243.
86. Id. at 370, 225 N.W.2d at 245 (Kelly, J., concurring specially).
87. Wilde, Dipe~age in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (1968). For a
discussion of statute of limitations and modern theories of conflict of laws, see Grossman,
su.pra note 15; Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Conkct of Laws, 19 WASH-
BURN L.J. 405 (1980).
88. 328 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1983).
89. Id. at 151.
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In plaintiff's suit in Minnesota against the drivers and owners of
the two cars, she sought to join the Wisconsin defendants' liability
insurer as a defendant. Under Wisconsin law, 9° such joinder was
proper despite a no-direct action clause in the policy, which in this
case was issued in Wisconsin. Direct actions against liability insur-
ers are prohibited in Minnesota. 91 Treating the conflict as proce-
dural-one of joinder of parties-the Davis court held that the law
of the forum governed.9 2 The court distinguished Myers on the
ground that the Louisiana direct action statute applied in Mers
was substantive.
93
Because of the thin and frequently imperceptible line between
substantive and procedural rules, the dissenters in Davis advocated
use of Professor Leflar's choice influencing considerations to re-
solve all conflicts. 94 In this case the dissenters presumably would
have chosen the plaintiff-favoring, "better" Wisconsin rule of law.
Hague v. Allstate Insurance Co. 95 and Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co. 96 were insurance cases in which the court adhered to its
policy of spreading the losses from automobile accidents among
the insurance premium-paying public, and applied the plaintiff-
favoring "better" law of Minnesota to accomplish that purpose.
9 7
The Hague court came close to exceeding its legislative jurisdic-
tion98 and had judicial jurisdiction only because the defendant in-
surance company was doing business-unrelated to the
litigation-in Minnesota.
In Hague a Wisconsin resident was killed in Wisconsin while rid-
ing on his Wisconsin son's uninsured motorcycle which collided
with the automobile of an uninsured Wisconsin motorist. The trip
had no connection to Minnesota. The decedent, however, had
worked in and commuted to Minnesota for thirteen years before
his death. After the accident, his widow moved to Minnesota
where she probated his estate. As executrix she sued the uninsured
90. Id. at 151-52; see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.04(2) (West 1977).
91. See Miller v. Market Men's Mut. Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 509, 115 N.W.2d 266 (1962).
92. 328 N.W.2d at 153.
93. Id. at 152 n.2.
94. Id. at 153 (Todd, J., dissenting).
95. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979), affd, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
96. Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 284 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
97. 289 N.W.2d at 47, 49; 284 N.W.2d at 833.
98. 289 N.W.2d at 50-54 (Otis, J., dissenting); see Martin, PersonalJur'sdtaltn, supra
note 15 at 883-88.
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motorist insurer of the decedent for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine whether his uninsured motorist insurance of $15,000 on
each of his three automobiles covered the accident. The insurance
policies were issued in Wisconsin. The court, admitting the scant
governmental interest of the forum, chose as the "better rule of
law" 99 Minnesota's "stacking" of the coverage of separate no-fault
policies over Wisconsin's non-stacking law. Again the Minnesota
court selected the plaintiff-favoring law. The court recognized but
minimized Professor Leflar's first choice influencing consideration,
predictability of result, usually important in solving contracts con-
flicts.100 The court justified its legislative jurisdiction to apply
Minnesota law by saying that an insurer of automobiles could rea-
sonably foresee that coverage might be governed by the law of the
state into which a vehicle traveled. 01
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a five-three deci-
sion.102 By aggregating all of the Minnesota connections, the
Court was able to find that Minnesota had a sufficient interest in
applying Minnesota law so that neither full faith and credit nor
due process was violated.10 3 This aggregation of Minnesota con-
tacts-which made it fair and reasonable to apply Minnesota
law-consisted of the following:
1. The insured worked in and commuted to Minnesota;
2. The insurer did business in Minnesota;
3. Plaintiff, insured's widow, resided in Minnesota at the time
of suit;
4. The insured's estate was probated in Minnesota.
These contacts together with the ambulatory protection given by
automobile insurance policies provide the requisite territorial con-
nections.' 0 4 The Court did not hold that any one or any combina-
tion of these connections less than all would satisfy the
requirements of due process or full faith and credit.' 0 5 Therefore,
it still remains doubtful whether a plaintiffs residence or a defend-
ant's doing business in a state, or both, without more, will satisfy
constitutional requirements for application of forum law. Justice
99. 289 N.W.2d at 49.
100. Id. at 48; see R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, § 103.
101. 289 N.W.2d at 48.
102. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
103. Id. at 302.
104. Id.
105. As stated by the court, "We express no view whether the first two contacts, either
together or separately, would have sufficed to sustain the choice of Minnesota law made
by the Minnesota Supreme Court." Id. at 320 n.29.
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Stevens, concurring, said that the choice of law was unsound but
constitutional. 0 6  He distinguished the policies underlying full
faith and credit from those underlying due process. The former is
a protection of the states' sovereignty, the latter protects individual
rights.10 7 The dissenting justices-through Justice Powell-said
that even the aggregation of the contacts was too trivial and irrele-
vant to provide any significant state interest.10 8 The Minnesota
Supreme Court itself was unable to find a sufficient governmental
interest for application of forum law and based its choice primarily
on its view that forum law was "better."'
0 9
Hine does not present problems of either judicial or legislative
jurisdiction. The connections of Minnesota to the litigation and
the parties were more than adequate to satisfy both. A- Florida
woman was injured in an automobile accident in Minnesota with
a Minnesota motorist while she was riding with her Florida hus-
band. She sued her husband and the Minnesota motorist in Min-
nesota and recovered. Her husband then brought action in
Minnesota against his liability insurer for a declaratory judgment
that the insurance covered interspousal tort claims, although the
insurance policy and the Florida law under which the policy was
issued excluded such claims from coverage. Once again, the Min-
nesota court ascribed minor importance to Professor Leflar's factor
of predictability of result for the solution of insurance-tort con-
flicts.110 The court was primarily concerned that a law not be cho-
sen that was inconsistent with its notions of fairness and justice.1'1
Blarney v. Brown 112 stretched judicial jurisdiction to the breaking
point.11 3 The court applied the Minnesota rule of common-law
106. Id. at 331-32.
107. Id. at 322-31.
108. Id. at 337.
109. 289 N.W.2d at 49.
110. 284 N.W.2d at 833.
111. Id.
112. 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980), overruled, West
Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., Finance and Commerce, Aug. 26, 1983, at 7, col. 2 (Minn.
Aug. 26, 1983) (subsequent Supreme Court decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), compel shift of
due process focus from interests of resident plaintiffs to interests of foreign defendants); see
also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
113. See West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., Finance and Commerce, Aug. 26, 1983, at
7, col. 2 (Minn. Aug. 26, 1983), overming Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.
1978). In Westin, the Minnesota court noted the "dramatic shift in the constitutional
theoretical underpinnings of personal jurisdiction" evidenced by the recent Supreme
1982]
15
Danforth: Developments in the Minnesota Law of Conflict of Laws
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
liability as the better rule of law to an illegal sale of liquor in Wis-
consin by a Wisconsin bar owner to a Minnesota resident who be-
came intoxicated, causing injury in Minnesota to a Minnesota
plaintiff. Although the injury occurred in Minnesota, the exten-
sion of Minnesota law to a liquor sale in Wisconsin by a Wisconsin
bar owner, who incurred no liability under Wisconsin law, also
came close to breaking the boundaries of legislative jurisdiction.
The defendant operated a bar in Hudson, Wisconsin, a small
town near the Minnesota border, about a mile and a half from the
interstate freeway leading to the metropolitan area of St. Paul and
Minneapolis. Wisconsin bars by law could stay open later than
those of Minnesota. Based upon the proximity of defendant's bar
to the freeway and the metropolitan area, and the late hours al-
lowing Wisconsin bars to attract Minnesota customers, the court
decided it had judicial jurisdiction ' 4 under the Minnesota long-
arm statutes.1-5 There was, however, no evidence that the defend-
ant advertised, solicited, made any purchases for his business, or
otherwise did business in Minnesota.
1 6
Having decided that it had jurisdiction over the defendant, the
court held that the Minnesota Civil Damage Act 1 7 had not in-
tended extra-territorial effect upon this transaction, but that the
Minnesota rule of common-law liability extended to the Wisconsin
sale and resultant injury in Minnesota to the Minnesota plaintiff.
According to the court this was the better rule of law." 8
Follese v. Eastern Airines" 9 was a workers' compensation case.
The plaintiff, a permanent resident of Minnesota, was hired as a
flight attendant by a Florida-based airline under a contract of em-
ployment entered into in Florida. She was based in Florida for
Court decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and Rush
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Id. at 8, col. 1. The Westin court stated:
[T]he critical focus in any jurisdictions analysis must be on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation." Rush, 444 U.S. at 327
(quoting Shaffr v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). This tripartite relationship
is defined by the defendant's contacts with the forum state, not by the defend-
ant's contacts with residents of the forum. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 250-55 (1958); Aaron Ferer &Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron, 558 F.2d 450, 455 n.6
(8th Cir. 1977).
Id.
114. 270 N.W.2d at 886-88; see also Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 247 N.W.2d
913 (1976), overruled, West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., Finance and Commerce, Aug. 26,
1983, at 7, col. 2 (Minn. Aug. 26, 1983).
115. MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1982).
116. 270 N.W.2d at 886.
117. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1982).
118. 270 N.W.2d at 890-91.
119. 271 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1978).
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eight years during which time she sustained work-related injuries
on three flights. The only flight that was connected with Minne-
sota was the second flight which had originated from Minneapolis-
St. Paul. After she became disabled as a result of her injuries, she
returned to Minnesota where she had retained her permanent resi-
dence, and initiated a proceeding under the Minnesota Workers'
Compensation Act, ° 20 since an action in Florida was barred by the
Florida statute of limitations.
The Minnesota Act was then silent as to its extra-territorial ef-
fect upon this situation.' 2 ' The court, however, granted the plain-
tiff workers' compensation benefits, basing legislative jurisdiction
on the permanent residence of the defendant in Minnesota, her
receipt of welfare assistance in Minnesota when she returned to the
state, and the fact that the airline operated flights in and out of the
Twin Cities' airport and had a ticket office there. 122 Whether
these connections supplied an adequate basis for application of
Minnesota law is debatable until the Supreme Court more explic-
itly defines the boundaries of legislative jurisdiction.
In Ewers v. Thunderbird Avzation, Inc. ,123 the court construed the
Minnesota Airplane Owner's Responsibility Act 124 to cover an air-
plane accident in Colorado. A Minnesota plaintiff sued the Min-
nesota owner of a Minnesota-based private airplane for injuries
suffered in an accident in Colorado on a round-trip flight from
Minnesota to Colorado in a plane leased by the defendant to the
Minnesota pilot. The court applied the Minnesota statute impos-
ing liability on the owner for the negligence of the pilot. The court
clearly had both judicial and legislative jurisdiction, but the con-
troversy was over the construction of the statute and its intended
extra-territorial effect. 125 The dissenting justices-who took the
position that the Act applied only to Minnesota accidents-would
have chosen Minnesota law as the better rule of law had the legis-
lature in their view not restricted the Act's extra-territorial
application. 1
26
120. MINN. STAT. §§ 176.011-.82 (1982).
121. 271 N.W.2d at 830.
122. Id. at 830-32.
123. 289 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 1979).
124. MINN. STAT. § 360.0216 (1982).
125. 289 N.W.2d at 97-99; see Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legts/atwe In-
tent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980).
126. 289 N.W.2d at 101 (Otis, J., dissenting).
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Petty v. Allstate Insurance Co. 127 was an insurance case in which a
California resident, who was injured in an automobile accident in
Minnesota, recovered basic economic loss benefits under the Min-
nesota no-fault insurance statute. 128 Minnesota's no-fault law has
a built-in conflict of laws provision which automatically converts
the liability insurance of a non-resident to no-fault insurance
under the Minnesota statute to cover an automobile accident of
the non-resident in Minnesota.129 In Pety the requirements of
both judicial and legislative jurisdiction were satisfied by the oc-
currence of the accident in Minnesota and the fact that the insur-
ance company was doing business in Minnesota.
In Bzgelow v. Halloran ,130 the second case in which forum law was
not applied, the court again followed the plaintiff favoring "better
rule of law." A Minnesota resident intentionally shot and injured
the plaintiff, an Iowa resident, and then killed himself. The shoot-
ing occurred in Iowa. A suit for damages was brought in Minne-
sota against the Minnesota executor of the deceased's estate
probated in Minnesota. At the time of the shooting the plaintiff
was a resident of Iowa working in Minnesota. At the time of suit
she was a resident of Minnesota. Under Iowa law 131 the cause of
action for an intentional tort survived the death of the tortfeasor
while under Minnesota law it did not. 132
The Minnesota Supreme Court chose Iowa law. Minnesota has
"no legitimate governmental interest in transferring the decedent's
estate intact to his heirs to the exclusion of a seriously injured in-
tentional tort victim.' 33 The court stated that "it is in the interest
of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.' 1 34 The
Minnesota law "undermines this state interest."'' 35 Minnesota law
is a relic of the old common law and not in accord with modern
127. 290 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1980).
128. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1982).
129. Id. §§ 65B.47, .50 (1982).
130. 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981).
131. IOWA CODE § 611.20 (1981).
132. MINN. STAT. §§ 573.01, 525.1-201(4) (1982). MINN. STAT. § 573.01 allowed sur-
vival actions for personal injury or death against the personal representative of the de-
ceased tortfeasor except in cases of intentional tort. In 1982, the Minnesota Supreme
Court struck down the intentional tort exception as violative of equal protection under the
Minnesota Constitution. Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
Thompson is an example of the "growing pains" experienced by state domestic law. See
Freund, supra note 10.
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developments. Here the court gave greater protection to a non-
resident than it could give to a resident unless it held the Minne-
sota statute unconstitutional. The court could clearly apply Iowa
law without violation of full faith and credit or due process. The
result, of course, is the same as it would have been under the dis-
carded place-of-injury conflict of laws rules.
Since the adoption of Professor Leflar's choice influencing con-
siderations, the Minnesota Supreme Court has had occasion in
three cases to consider conflicts in areas other than torts. The case
of In re Estate of Congdon136 involved consolidated appeals of court
orders issued in three causes of action arising out of the murder of
Elisabeth Congdon. During the probate of the estate a petition
was filed objecting to the distribution of funds to Marjorie Cald-
well, daughter of the deceased, on the grounds of her possible in-
volvement in the murder. The trial of Marjorie Caldwell had
resulted in a verdict of not guilty. A number of the heirs of Elisa-
beth Congdon brought a motion requesting a civil trial to deter-
mine Marjorie Caldwell's entitlement under section 524.2-803 of
the Minnesota Statutes.137 In response Marjorie Caldwell brought
a declaratory judgment action in which she sought a declaration
from the court that her status as a beneficiary was to be deter-
mined under the law of the state of her residence, Colorado. The
dismissal of this action was appealed to the Minnesota Supreme
Court along with several other court orders rendered in the pro-
bating of the Congdon estate.
The appellant argued that although the court had jurisdiction
to apply the Minnesota Probate Code, section 524.2-803 should
not be applied because the Congdon estate was not in issue. In-
stead the appellant framed the issue as her status as a beneficiary
which she asserted should be resolved under the laws of her resi-
dence. After reviewing Leflar's choice influencing considerations
the court chose to apply Minnesota law. 138 Of the choice influenc-
ing factors it appears that the "better rule of law" was the decisive
factor since the court expressly stated that the Uniform Probate
Code was now the law of the majority of the jurisdictions. Since
the compensation of a tort victim was not the basis of this suit the
concept of loss distribution and resulting preference for plaintiff-
favoring law was not relevant to the choice of law analysis. One
136. 309 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. 1981).
137. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803 (1982).
138. 309 N.W.2d at 271.
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might question why the court addressed the choice of law issue
since it appears that the case involved a false conflict.
139
In Alside v. Larson,140 a "no-conflict" contract case, the court, in
order to carry out the presumed intent of the parties, validated a
covenant not to compete given to an Ohio employer by a Minne-
sota employee, employed in Minnesota. The court indicated that
this would have been the result had there been a conflict between
Ohio and Minnesota law. This is in accord with Professor Leflar's
first choice influencing consideration, predictability of result,
which is important in resolving conflicts involving consensual ar-
rangements.' 4 1 In Laikola v. Engneered Concrete142 the court refused
to recognize a common-law marriage when Montana, where such
marriages are valid, could not have done so because of the short
time the parties lived together in Montana and the impermanency
of their residence in that state. Presumably, the court would have
recognized the marriage had it been valid in Montana. Recogni-
tion in these circumstances would have been justified under Pro-
fessor Leflar's choice influencing considerations of predictability of
result and maintenance of interstate order in the interests of stabil-
ity, uniformity, and certainty in the status of marriage.
143
What choices the court will make when confronted with con-
flicts in the areas of property, 144 procedure, 45 corporations, 46 re-
ceivers 4 7 and persons 48 remains for the future. Will the court
make a choice based on its notions of fairness and justice in the
same way that it decided domestic cases? If so, is that method
feasible for the resolution of interstate conflicts in these areas?
V. RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision has touched upon
the problem of the recognition of child custody orders of sister
139. Compare MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803 (1982) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803
(1973).
140. 300 Minn. 285, 220 N.W.2d 274 (1974).
141. R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, § 103.
142. 277 N.W.2d 653 (Minn. 1979).
143. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, §§ 103, 104, 219-230.
144. See id. §§ 165-185, 232-237.
145. See id. §§ 121-130.
146. See id. §§ 251-260.
147. See id. §§ 212-217.
148. See id. §§ 239-248.
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states.1 49 A five-year-old child was adjudicated a dependent in
California because of the imprisonment of the father for murder-
ing the mother. The California court placed the child with an
aunt and uncle in Minnesota, reserving continuing jurisdiction
over the boy. Three years later the California court ordered the
boy removed to California to the home of a great aunt with the
purpose of facilitating his ultimate return to the father who had
been released from prison.
The Minnesota aunt and uncle sought an injunction and declar-
atory judgment in Minnesota to prevent the removal of the boy to
California. The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the contin-
uing jurisdiction of the California court under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), adopted by both Minnesota
150
and California, 151 but held that an evidentiary hearing should be
held in Minnesota under the provisions of the Act for the consider-
ation of the California court in resolving the issue of custody.
152
This case reflects the perplexing problems that arise in connec-
tion with the recognition of child custody orders of sister states,
problems which the UCCJA seeks to solve.15 3 The jurisdictional
provisions of the Act have recently been incorporated into federal
legislation implementing and supplementing the full faith and
credit clause of the federal constitution.
1 54
Landa v. Norris 155 was another case involving recognition of child
custody orders. North Dakota residents were divorced in North
Dakota, and the mother was awarded permanent custody of the
children. She moved to Ohio with the children. The father
moved to Minnesota. He sued in Ohio for permanent custody but
was denied. While the children were visiting the father in Minne-
sota he petitioned in a Minnesota court for permanent custody on
the ground that they were being abused by the mother while in
her custody. 156 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that under
the UCCJA the Ohio judgment must be recognized unless the
149. In re Mullins, 298 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 1980), noted in 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
245 (1982).
150. MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1982).
151. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
152. 298 N.W.2d at 62.
153. See Hay, supra note 15, at 181-82; Ratner, supra note 28, at 381-422.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980). See generally Coombs, Interstate Child Custody:
Jursdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982).
155. 313 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1981).
156. See MINN. STAT. § 518.A(4) (1982).
19821
21
Danforth: Developments in the Minnesota Law of Conflict of Laws
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Ohio court relinquished jurisdiction. 57
Matson v. Alatson 158 dealt with the recognition of the judgment of
a sister state for child support and alimony. Wisconsin residents
were divorced in Wisconsin and the wife was awarded child sup-
port and alimony. The father moved to Minnesota and estab-
lished a residence there. The mother and children remained in
Wisconsin. Several years later the mother filed a motion in the
divorce action for judgment for delinquent child support and ali-
mony payments. The father was personally served in Minnesota
with notice of the motion. He defaulted and a default judgment
was entered for the mother.
The judgment was registered in Minnesota under the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 59 The father moved in a
Minnesota court to vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the Wisconsin court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce the
Wisconsin divorce decree. 16° The Wisconsin court also had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the father by service of notice in Minnesota
and Minnesota was required by the full faith and credit clause to
recognize the Wisconsin judgment although it was modifiable.'
16
VI. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS
A recent decision of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota 16 2 provided an interpretation of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. ,163 the most recent of
the progeny of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 164 and Hanna v.
Plumer.'65 In Walker, a diversity suit, the complaint was filed
under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 166 before the
157. 313 N.W.2d at 424-25.
158. 310 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1981).
159. MINN. STAT. §§ 548.26-.33 (1982).
160. 310 N.W.2d at 507; see also Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1981).
161. 310 N.W.2d at 507. The petitioner's further attempts to modify the Wisconsin
judgment were again rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Matson v. Matson,
333 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 1983).
162. Foster v. Seattle Tent & Fabric Co., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 517 (D. Minn. 1981). But
cf. Sieg v. Karnes, 693 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1982) (federal court should apply state statute
commencing action upon service of summons when conflict involves statute of
limitations).
163. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
164. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
165. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
166. Rule 3 provides that, "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
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expiration of the statute of limitations of the state of suit, but the
summons was not served until after the statute of limitations had
elapsed. Under Federal Rule 3 an action is commenced by filing
the complaint with the court while under the state statute an ac-
tion is commenced by service of the summons.
The Walker Court held the state statute barred the suit because
a direct conflict was not present between the state statute and the
federal rule. The state statute was not intended to determine the
time when a law suit is commenced for the purpose of statutes of
limitations. The state statute, however, governed both the time
period and the time of commencement of suit within that period.
The two were integral parts of the statute, and because the time
period was applicable in this diversity suit, 16 7 the entire statute
governed. 68
In Foster v. Seattle Tent & Fabrc' 69 a diversity suit, the complaint
was also filed before the expiration of the state's statutory time
period, 70 but the summons was served afterward. The court held
that Rule 3 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure providing
that an action is commenced by service of the summons' 7' is not
an integral part of the state's statute of limitation. Therefore, the
federal rule is applicable.
Before the adoption of the Minnesota Rule 3, the provisions of
the rule governing commencement of suit were contained in the
statute of limitation 72 but were removed from the statute to be-
167. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
168. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. at 752.
169. 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 517 (D. Minn. 1981). But cf. Sieg v. Karnes, 693 F.2d 803,
804-05 (8th Cir. 1982) (Walker v. Armco Steel construed as requiring federal district court to
apply state law that, for statute of limitations purposes, deems an action commenced only
when service is made).
170. Id. at 518-19.
171. Rule 3 states that:
3.01 Commencement of the Action
A civil action is commenced against each defendant when the summons is
served upon him or is delivered to the proper officer for such service; but such
delivery shall be ineffectual unless within 60 days thereafter the summons be
actually served on him or the first publication thereof be made.
3.02 Service of Complaint
A copy of the complaint shall be served with the summons, except when the service
is by publications as provided in Rule 4.04.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.
172. This statute provided that:
An action shall be considered as begun against each defendant when the
summons is served on him, or on a codefendant who is a joint contractor or
otherwise united in interest with him, or is delivered to the proper officer for such
1982]
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come Rule 3. An argument may be made therefore, that the rule
is an integral part of the statute and that the conflict between the
federal rule and the state statute is indirect, leading to application
of the state rule.
V. CONCLUSION
In solving tort and related insurance conflicts cases by choosing
the plaintiff-favoring law as the better rule of law, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has adopted a simple, yet pragmatic and common
sense method of analysis 173 in comparison to the controversial, per-
plexing theories and methods of the modern writers, 74 including
Professor Leflar himself who now sees a "Judicial Eclecticism"
emerging from all of the proposed theories. 175 The late Professor
Prosser put it this way: "The realm of the conflict of laws is a
dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by
learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious
matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary
court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in
it."
176 The route chosen by the Minnesota Supreme Court is one
way of avoiding or getting out of these quagmires.
In most of the Minnesota cases here summarized, the conflict
was between laws that are becoming obsolete and those that are in
step with modern development. 177 When considered in that light,
service; but, as against any defendant not served within the period of limitation,
such delivery shall be ineffectual, unless within 60 days thereafter the summons
be actually served on him or the first publication thereof be made. When an
action is begun it shall be deemed pending until the final judgment therein has
been satisfied.
Minn. Rev. Laws ch. 66, §§ 13, 14 (1866) (superseded by Rules of Civil Procedure 1949).
173. See Reese, supra note 9.
174. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1980); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1962); R. LEFLAR, supra note 2; A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS:
CHOICE OF LAW (1980); Leflar, Choice of Law. A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 10 (Spring 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1969).
175. R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, §§ 99-109; Leflar, supra note 38, at 14-15; see also West-
brook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecti-
ci-m, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975).
176. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
177. For a workable, understandable choice of law theory, when applied to many of
the areas in which conflicts may occur, see Davies & Rathke, Choice of Law Based on the Seat
of the Relationship, 10 VALPARAISO L. REV. 1 (1975). The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, in Hime v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 284 N.W.2d 829, 833 n.3 (Minn.
1979), rejected this theory in favor of the better rule of law.
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the results have not been patently unfair or unjust. To reach those
results, however, the court in a few cases has stepped to the edge of
the boundaries of its judicial and legislative jurisdiction.
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